Of all the demons that accompany us in golf, as a projection of what life itself often is, today the one that has stepped forward and knocked at my door is Laplace. When I open it I find that superior, omniscient intelligence that, with sufficient information, would be able to predict the future, without any deviation, without any error and without any surprise. It would be that perfect observer who knows everything and, therefore, becomes a black angel that makes us think everything can be understood and controlled. A strange companion for reflection so, to be able to continue this account, I prefer to close the door with determination, although without the slam we have all at some time wished to give to flee nameless and impossible stories.
If there is any field where this way of understanding the world does not apply it is golf, where error has a particular way of appearing because it neither bursts in nor is obvious and for that reason can sometimes feel even cruel. Imagine a shot that, without reaching the powerful sound produced by the swing of Boom Boom Couples, in the feast of the senses does not sound bad on contact and seems correct for the seconds needed to pick up the tee. The ball flies straight and describes a clean trajectory that is, in turn, the obvious consequence of a solid motion. Easy to picture, right? Only later, when it begins to fall, is revealed what was always there and which translates into a small deviation, perhaps just a metre more, but on the wrong side.
That is why golf, more than a game of successes, is an accumulation of misunderstood errors. Surely Palmer would have needed to add something stronger to the lemon tea he habitually drank to destroy not only the statistics, as he did with his game, but the very paradox he popularised when he maintained that golf is deceptively simple and desperately complex.
For a long time, no one seemed particularly interested in understanding those errors better and therefore being able, at least, to explain them. However, in the early 2000s, in an office at the Columbia Business School — a university that, by the way, has never been a factory of great golfers, but has produced the odd “Martin”, like Rychy Werenski- Mark Broadie — someone was working on another kind of problem as a professor specialising in risk management, numerical methods and simulations.
His day-to-day professional work revolved around modelling uncertainty in financial markets that many liken to the exercise a monkey would do with a crystal ball.
Strangely, his obsession was not golf but uncertainty. He was not a lifelong golfer desperately seeking the holy grail that would make them play better; what he first tried to do was understand golf. In his early models there were no numbers of fairways hit or putts per round, but there was uncertainty, markets that do not behave as they should, decisions made without knowing all the variables and systems where the result rarely depends on a single factor.
Broadie, at some peak of his gamma waves, realised that this was, in essence, the same kind of problem that golf had been unable to formulate for decades. He did not come to golf to change it but as some researchers arrive at a side phenomenon, with a discomfort hard to ignore. Like Einstein when he saw that light did not fit classical physics, he noticed that, at that time, the golf statistics and metrics used by the PGA based on the triad of fairways hit, greens in regulation and number of putts did not explain what they claimed to explain.
In short, he concluded that golf is easy to measure in outcome (read strokes) but very hard to break down into the real causes of performance, and for that you need to measure every shot in context, as if it were a song by Camarón, “where it comes from and where it is going”, because it is not the same to always arrive from the fairway and hit controlled irons as it is to live in the rough and save yourself with magic. And if you do not believe me, compare Faldo versus Mickelson, the Lefty par excellence.
Two other players such as David Toms and John Daly could share similar numbers and yet play in radically different ways. It was not a question of talent. It was a question of measurement. And what is not measured well, in any discipline, tends to be misinterpreted and, as you may have read me say before, what are not calculations are tales. The scoreboard only adds up and does not distinguish between those who build and those who improvise.
What followed was not a visible revolution and there was no inaugural moment for this shift from the abacus to the financial calculator facilitated by the young Columbia professor. For several years, Broadie did something that, seen from the outside, hardly has a narrative and much less glamour: he simply collected data, sorted it, compared it and asked it to say something that until then no one had asked.
Golf had been producing that liquid gold that data now are for so many companies for many years, but it had to be Broadie who carved the jewel of knowledge. What emerged when polishing that jewel was a concept hard to ignore and that is now on the lips of all the knowledgeable (and the not so much) about this simply complex sport, and that is the concept of “strokes gained” as a way to measure how much better or worse you execute a shot relative to what was expected.
Millions of shots later, golf began to look less like a game of perfect execution and more like a system of decisions under uncertainty. Not all errors weighed the same nor did all successes count the same even though for years a one-metre putt was counted exactly the same as a 280-metre drive. Short game still mattered, but it no longer told the whole story nor, therefore, victory. The real difference lay in everything that happened before reaching the green. Every position on the course carried an expectation. Every shot, a deviation from it. It was in 2011 when Broadie named that discomfort in a study that would change how golf is measured: ”Assessing Golfer Perfomance on the PGA TOUR”. However, the language of golf was not ready for that idea.
When in 2014 the PGA Tour began to integrate these metrics, it did not do so as someone adopting a revolutionary theory but as someone discovering a tool too useful to ignore. The impact was, in many ways, silent. There is no clear image of that change. There is no before and after that can be etched into the annals of history. Yet the idea began to filter slowly into the places where things really change: in the choice of a target, in the renunciation of an aggressive shot, in the acceptance of a probable error. Golf stopped being solely an exercise in precision and also became an exercise in management.
Years later tools and features that take that logic beyond the professional circuits came to light. What once required access to exclusive data began to appear on mobile phones, discreet smart watches and in recommendations that arrive before every shot and not necessarily from the person carrying your bag.
All the players to whom we have traditionally been guided by intuition, feelings, memory — most often selective — or the help of a conscientious and objective caddie, began to find ourselves confronted with a more precise, of course less indulgent, version of our own game. What artificial intelligence introduces now is not so much an improvement as a consequence. If every shot can be measured, and every decision evaluated, the next step — which is already arriving, by the way — is obvious and will be to suggest strategies and specific shots based on models built and personalised with the precision once attributed to Swiss mechanical watches.
The tour already offers scenes that seem taken from that future. Players like Collin Morikawa or DeChambeau, paradigms of analytical golf, reach situations where the optimal decision is practically defined before executing the shot. Statistics leave no room for doubt. And yet the result does not always follow that logic. Because golf, even now, resists becoming a predictable, closed system.
In a conversation that my beloved Rory kindly agreed to have on the notable date of a birthday he was going to celebrate at home (surely as a counterpoint to the ten days of intense revelry post second victory at Augusta) with the Kelce brothers, two former American football players, on the podcast New Heights, he let slip, between truth and jokes, the idea that modern golf seems to be constantly debating itself. It is an axiom that statistics help, but it is not advisable to live before them in the same posture with which he received his first victory at the Masters. At some point, the player has to close the data window and trust something much older: their skill, instinct and confidence.
The future Sir Rory Mcrlloy (and I do not predict it out of fondness but out of appraisal) has the clear line that metrics can guide a decision, but they cannot hit the shot for you, although that has the counterpoint that error can no longer easily hide in doubt, because the player will always have the optimal decision more within reach than the hole itself. That is why modern golf lives in a strange tension: the more it learns to measure itself, the more fear arises of losing what it never knew how to calculate entirely.
Broadie is 65 years old and continues working in his office (another example of someone who daily flies the flag against ageism, by the way). His field of study remains largely the same and is how people make decisions when they do not have all the information.
He taught that the game was worse understood than believed and Rory reminds us with his words — and, above all, with his actions — that there are shots that still cannot be explained on their own and that this is the rationale of the eternal dichotomy between probability versus imagination, or, in other words, the tension between data and instinct.
The more golf is understood and measured the harder it will also be to believe in magic. The future of golf will not consist of a fully optimised sport, where a perfect automated decision guarantees immediate results, because that would be as impossible as recovering the millions invested in the LIV. Over the years we will have to accept that there are shots that do not fit entirely into a statistic and that the appeal of competition will depend, precisely, on that mix of fear, intuition and confidence with which players face each round against a stationary ball. And in that scenario, the challenge will not only be to execute a good shot and invoke whoever you want so that it is accompanied by a coherent result, but to accept, with a new clarity, that even when we know exactly what should be done we remain profoundly human in attempting it.


